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THE ROLE OF THE ARTICLE I
"TRIAL JUDGE"
EDWARD
I.

F.

LUSSIER·

INTRODUCTION

It makes little sense to debate the worth of any role without
defining its purpose and past performance. Also, it should be recog
nized at the outset that the field of administrative law has grown, as
have other fields oflaw, in direct proportion to the growth of govern
ment and the need to provide fair alternatives to ever growing court
dockets. No such alternatives have realistically presented themselves
without simultaneous recognition that disputes which cannot be set
tled by agreement require a resolution process which is both per
ceived as fair and is productive of a record which will permit the
most effective and least burdensome court review. Since most claims
where the federal government is a party provide for court review I
and because many, if not most, involve complex factual issues, and
none involve juries, the role of the individual decider of fact be
comes significant. All the more so because the individual judge who
presides is given latitude in important matters such as discovery and
admissibility of evidence and in the conduct of the evidentiary hear
ing2 which directly affects the record upon which the decision will
ultimately be based. No trial lawyer would regard these powers
lightly in consideration of the fact that later court review will be
based on that record. It is therefore of great interest to the practicing
• Administrative Law Judge, Department of Health &: Human Services; fonner
Judicial Officer for United States Postal Service and Chairman of Postal Service Board of
Contract Appeals; fonner Administrative Judge with Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals. J.D., Loyola University School of Law, 1950; admitted to the bars of Illinois,
Federal District Coun for Northem District of Illinois, United States Supreme Coun
and United States Coun of Claims.
This anicle was written by the author in his private capacity. No official suppon or
endorsement by the Depanment of Health &: Human Services or any fonner depanment
with which the author was associated is intended or should be inferred.
The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research assistance provided
by Ron Piombino, a law student at the Westem New England College School of Law.
1. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
2. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1983) (Social Security Administration). The regu
lations vary from agency to agency.
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bar and to the public at large that this function is faithfully and com
petently discharged.
The federal government has consistently maintained high quali
fication standards to insure, insofar as possible, the appointment of
individual trial judges based on experience and merit and to afford a
level of independence not associated with other executive depart
ment positions, in recognition of the unique nature of the position
and to instill public confidence in the system. The Article I judge
does not have the independence or stature of the Article III federal
judiciary since he is still an employee of the Executive Department
and subject to its jurisdiction and appropriate control and supervi
sion in most matters,3 although not in the exercise of his honest and
independent judgment in ruling on matters before him or deciding
cases, except insofar as he is bound by lawful agency regulations.
This does not, however, alter the judicial nature of the adjudicatory
function involved.4
Much has been written about the role of administrative law
judges in relationship to the agency's superior authority and about
congressional policy and intent. It is not the purpose of this article to
address these issues. Certainly there has been a trend toward
judicialization in the administrative process and this tends to create
an appearance of separation of interests but there is little question
that the agency retains ultimate authority to accept or reject an ad
3. The administrative law judge is appointed in accordance with the Administra
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 3105 (1982). An action may be taken against an adminis
trative law judge only if good cause is found by the Merit Systems Protection Board.Id.
§7521 (1982).
4. The chief senatorial sponsor of the Administrative Procedure Act attributed to it
the design "to make examiners a separate and independent corps of hearing officers wor
thy of judicial traditions," McCarran, Three Years ofThe Administrative Procedure Act
A Study In Legis/ation, 38 GEO. LJ. 574, 583 (1950), and to make them "(o)n paper at
least...very nearly the equivalent of judges, albeit operating within the federal system
of administrative justice." Id. at 582. Perhaps the leading case in recognizing the judicial
nature of the role of the federal administrative law judge is Butz v. &:onomou, 438 U.S.
478 (1978), where the United States Supreme Court held that such judges have an abso
lute immunity from liability for damages for actions taken in their quasi-judicial capac
ity. 438 U.S. at 514. The Court stated that "although a qualified immunity from damages
liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional vio
lations, our decisions recognize that there are some officials whose special functions re
quire a full exemption from liability." Id. at 508. It went on to state that "adjudication
within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial
process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits
for damages," id. at 512-13, and that "(t)here can be little doubt that the role of the
modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is
'functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Id. at 513.
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ministrative law judge's decision,s to issue federal regulations which
have the force and effect of law,6 and, in many cases, to issue prece
dential decisions binding on an administrative law judge. 7 This arti
cle starts with the reality that administrative law judges exist and
that they exist to hear and decide cases without bias or interference.
Due process does not require in every instance a formal eviden
tiary hearing or require a decisionmaker possessing the qualifica
tions of an administrative law judge or one given the statutory
mantle of protection and implied independence given to administra
tive law judges.s That issue relates, however, to cases in which the
federal agency chooses not to provide, and no statute requires pro
viding, the type of trier of fact we know as the administrative law
judge. When the federal commitment is made to provide the higher
level right - the right to be heard by an administrative law judge 
the issue of appropriate independence takes on greater meaning.
To place the issue of "independence" in proper perspective it
first must be recognized that there are substantive differences be
tween Social Security hearings and other federal agency hearings
presided over by administrative law judges. However, as a starting
premise it g~nerally is conceded by all of goodwill that true indepen
dence in the sense of freedom from bias, coercion or outside influ
ence affecting either the process of a fair hearing or the substantive
decision issuing thereafter is essential in all hearings. Secondly, there
should be no quaint distinction between direct interference with that
purpose and subtle interference with that purpose. Both are anath
ema to fairness. It is a basic principle that responsibility is not given
witho~t correlative authority sufficient to carry out that
responsibility.
The role of the administrative law judge in the federal govern
ment is mainly to determine facts and then apply the law. There are
relatively few cases in which new legal precedent is being estab
lished or where the law is seriously in question. There are indeed
federal agency proceedings where the judge's decision does serve as
a precedent and, in effect, shapes the development of the law, but
this is certainly not the situation in Social Security cases where the
question of ''independence'' has most frequently been raised. The
5. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Each agency determines the details for agency review of ad
ministrative law judges' decisions. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.983 (1983).
6. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979).
7. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1983).
8. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,200 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319,334 (1976).
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few court cases which have addressed the problem have not resolved
it yet since they await the resolution of factual allegations in cases
still pending where crucial findings have not been made yet. 9
The administrative law judge functioning as a fact finder must
weigh evidence and assess credibility. In virtually all cases he is op
erating on a record different from that which the preliminary agency
decisionmaker utilized, not only in the form of further documentary
evidence but also in the form of live testimony. Also, quite often
legal representation first surfaces at the hearing level. Despite the
power and duty of the administrative law judge (other than in Social
Security cases) to promote settlement, the nature of the administra
tive process changes and the negotiating table is exchanged for the
courtroom, although that forum is still available to the parties.
In adversary hearings it is not unusual to find the full case first
unveiled at the hearing. Whether this is due to the inherent nature of
the proceeding with its access to discovery and right of cross exami
nation or whether this is due to the opposing parties' realization that
this is their last chance to produce evidence, the effect is the same.
Positions firmly taken in initial stages of the process leading to the
hearing are often tempered when the opposing side's evidence is
viewed in this perspective. Firm convictions sometimes become best
estimates and firm recollections only best recollections. Slight holes
in the documentary record often take on larger proportions. Quali
fied experts concede some value to the viewpoints of opposing quali
fied experts and scientific fact becomes scientific opinion. If the
hearing process is fair and complete, if the evidence is fully adduced
and the parties properly prepared, the hearing process is well suited
to arrive at the objective truth on an issue as best as humanly possi
ble. On the other hand in nonadversarial hearings where the govern
ment is unrepresented, as in Social Security cases, the
administrative law judge has a greater burden in discharging his
duty to develop the evidence and is more often faced with the diffi
cult question of credibility not so common in other cases.
The value of any system purporting to utilize an unbiased trier
of fact, whether titled "trial judge," "administrative law judge,"
"hearing examiner" or "commissioner," rests on the integrity of the
9. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), was remanded by the court of
appeals to the district court after upholding the administrative law judge's standing to
sue on allegations of agency interference with his decisional independence. No further
decision has been issued as of this writing. Nor has a decision been issued by the District
Court for the District of Columbia in Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v.
Heckler, No. 83-124 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 19, 1983).
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individual occupying the position. Further, it assumes a procedure
reasonably calculated to assure the opportunity to hear and consider
all relevant evidence and to reach a decision without outside influ
ence. This is true whether the decision is the final decision or an
intermediate decision subject to further appeal. When someone is
provided by law and regulation with detailed quasi-judicial respon
sibilities, and explicit powers, and when rights are provided litigants,
a promise is made. The promise is fulfilled only if in fact substance
follows form. If this is lacking, the purpose of the procedure is frus
trated. These considerations are often overlooked in discussions
concentrating on the "overview" of a system and on statistical per
formance. Fundamentals thus become implicitly, if not expressly,
relegated to a place of secondary importance or are simply assumed
to be present despite evidence to the contrary. Unquestionably there
are very real problems existing in agencies of the federal and state
governments with respect to case baCklogs and processing times. 10
Moreover, it is clear that both federal and state agencies hold the
policymaking power and have the final word, subject only to court
review. This does not change, however, the inherent function of the
trial judge. Erroneous decisions can be reversed by a reviewing au
thority. Apparent confficts in law or regulations can be remedied by
new law and new regulations. Improper conduct can be dealt with
by removal actions. The fact remains that a litigant who is led to
believe that he will have an unbiased trier of fact who will carefully
consider all the relevant evidence under a designated procedure
should be given what is promised. Thus, any study of the effective
ness of the administrative hearing system must ask first whether it is
doing what it is intended to do and what it holds itself out to the
public as doing. This is a question of fact. It is a question of how it
works and how well it works. A comparison between some federal
agencies may provide some insight in this regard.
II.

FEDERAL AGENCY HEARING UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT OR PATTERNED AFTER IT

The United States Postal Service is charged under federal stat
ute with protecting the public against material false representation
by mail. I I In the Postal Service, there is an Office of Administrative
10. See Day v. Schweiker. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982). cert. granted. 103 S. Ct. 1873
(1983); Caswell v. Califano. 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); Blankenship v. Mathews. 587 F.2d
329 (6th Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977). eerl. denied 435 U.S.
908 (1978); Crosby v. SSA. 550 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Mass. 1982).
II. 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Law Judges empowered to hear cases brought by complaints filed by
the consumer protection branch of the General Counsel's office. The
cases are litigated cases in which the respondent, who is charged
with violation of the false representation statute, is normally also
represented by private counsel.
Although some hearings are longer, an average case is heard in
less than half a day. The administrative law judge then issues a deci
sion from which either party may appeal to the Postal Service's Judi
cial Officer. The Judicial Officer is a statutory position with the
incumbent appointed by the Postmaster General to act finally for
him.12 The Judicial Officer then issues a final decision which, if un
favorable to the respondent, is accompanied by a mail stop order. 13
This order stops all mail addressed to the respondent unless it is
clear that such mail has no connection with the offending false ad
vertisement. The time from filing of complaint to issuance of a mail
stop order is often less than 90 days.
False advertising may also be the subject of a complaint and
hearing before the Federal Trade Commission. The case is heard by
an administrative law judge who also issues an initial decision. The
review authority is the Federal Trade Commission itself aided by
supporting staff, rather than a single chief judicial officer. The time
between filing a complaint and final agency decision is generally
longer than at the Postal Service. Both agencies are empowered to
settle the case through consent orders with the respondent and this
often happens obviating the need for hearings and decisions. In both
agencies the administrative law judges are completely independent
in arriving at their decisions and conduct full due process hearings
issuing detailed findings of fact and analysis supporting the conclu
sion reached. Because the complaints normally involve exaggerated
claims with respect to a product, it is not unusual to have expert
testimony. Generally the cases are decided on the particular facts
39 U.S.C. § 204 (1976) provides:
There shall be within the Postal Service a General Counsel, such number
of Assistant Postmasters General as the Board shall consider appropriate, and a
Judicial Officer. The General Counsel, the Assistant Postmasters General, and
the Judicial Officer shall be appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Post
master General. The Judicial Officer shall perform such quasi-judicial duties,
not inconsistent with chapter 36 of this title, as the Postmaster General may
designate. The Judicial Officer shall be the agency for the purposes of the re
quirements of chapter 5 of title 5, to the extent that functions are delegated to
him by the Postmaster General.
13. Act of November 30,1983, Pub. L. No. 98-186, 97 Stat. 1315, now authorizes
the issuance of cease and desist orders as an additional enforcement tool.
12.
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although previous cases are used as precedent. The decisions of the
Postal Service administrative law judges and the judicial officer are
printed and are available on request to the public. 14 The decisions of
the Federal Trade Commission are published and likewise avail
able. ls Published case precedents are thereby provided and such pre
cedent serves as a guide to the agency consumer protection
departments in bringing later cases and to the public in knowing
what to expect. The system is essentially that of an independent trial
judge whose decision is subject to agency review upon motion of
either party and ultimate recourse to federal court review. The sys
tem works because it provides what it promises to provide.
The role of the trier of fact in a federal agency proceeding is
generally complicated by the existence of conflicting evidence. In
many agencies this evidence is highly technical and there are oppos
ing professional or scientific opinions or both. Certainly this is true
in most cases involving medical issues. Very often the medical opin
ion relies heavily upon underlying facts which are essentially credi
bility issues. For example, the severity and extent of pain relating to
an objective injury also involves subjective factors and credibility of
a witness. Whether or not an important and material conversation
took place likewise may depend upon a determination of credibility.
Questions of an individual's participation in certain alleged activities
or knowledge of a certain fact, or receipt of a particular notice all
involve an issue of credibility. While there may be substantial cor
roborating documentary evidence there often is not and unless testi
mony is to be considered completely irrelevant it must be weighed.
There is little need for a hearing in the normal sense of the word
unless testimony is to be taken and given some weight. While there
is always the so called "clear cut" case, the majority of cases unfortu
nately still require the resolution of conflicting evidence and the
evaluation of live testimony. In fairness, something more than a pa
per review is required. In all of the agencies that utilize administra
tive law judges, recognition of this fact is found not only in the
establishment of a system providing hearings but also in the detailed
regulations and rules governing the process. Federal court cases re
viewing agency decisions are replete with holdings representing the
judicial expectation that such hearings be complete and fair in all
respects, with full consideration given to all of the evidence and that
14. These decisions are available for public inspection in the Postal Services Head
quarters Library in Washington, D.C. 39 C.F.R. § 265.6(a)(2) (1983).
15. See the Federal Trade Commission reporter.
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such consideration be reflected in the agency's written decision. 16
Dependent upon the particular subject matter jurisdiction in a given
agency, argument might be made that a different process would be
better suited to carrying out the agency function. Once a need for an
unbiased hearing is conceded, however, the need for a trial judge
becomes self-evident.
In addition to administrative law judges appointed under the
Administrative Procedure Act,17 federal agencies employ adminis
trative judges in other areas not specifically covered by the Act. This
further illustrates recognition of the value of the administrative trial
proceeding and its effectiveness.
The federal government is the largest purchaser in the world. It
is engaged in buying supplies and equipment, in research, in con
struction and in numerous other programs. All of this is done
through federal contracts and these contracts provide for processing
of claims, either by or against the government, and resolution of dis
putes through an administrative hearing process governed by a
Board of Contract Appeals utilizing administrative judges. Although
the Board's hearing process is not governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, its judges are appointed under stringent standards
and act independently of federal agency influence.
Most major federal departments have a Board of Contract Ap
peals and those that do not have delegated that responsibility to an
other Agency's Board of Contract Appeals,1s The hearings are
adversary proceedings, generally with counsel for each party. One
administrative judge will hear the case as trial judge. A transcript of
the hearing is available to him and that judge, if still available, will
prepare the decision, which is then submitted to a panel of the Board
16. See Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952 (1983); Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697
F.ld 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (lIth Cir. 1982); Wiggins
v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826 (11th Cir.
1982); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.ld 893 (ld Cir. 1980); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23
(2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris,602 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979); Rico v. Secretary, 593
F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cerro denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt V. Califano, 581 F.2d 164
(8th Cir. 1978); Beavers V. Secretary, 577 F.ld 383 (6th Cir. 1978); Daniel v. Mathews,
567 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977); Thome V. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1976); Coulter
V. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1975); Miranda V. Secretary, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir.
1975); Yawitz V. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1974); DePaepe V. Richardson, 464
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel V. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1971); Kutchman V.
Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970); Mark V. Celebrezze, 348 F.ld 289 (10th Cir. 1965);
Celebrezze V. Warren, 339 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1964).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
18. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (Supp. V 1981».
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if it is a large Board, such as the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, or to the full Board if it is a small Board, such as the Postal

Service Board of Contract Appeals, where the file is reviewed by
each Board member participating. Concurring and dissenting opin
ions may be written. A majority vote controls the decision. These
decisions are published decisions and used as precedent in future
cases. There is no further agency review. There is the right to court
review but it is not commonly pursued which may be taken as a
tribute of sorts to the competence of the decisions being issued.
These administrative judges thus perform two functions. The
first is as a trial judge. The second is as a concurring or dissenting
member on review of a case. On review of a case, those judges that
have reviewed the file and read the briefs and draft decision collabo
rate in the way appellate judges might, to arrive at a consensus
before the decision is finally released. This system has been recog
nized as effective over the years by the executive departments, by the
practicing bar, by the Judiciary and by the Congress. 19
The establishment of Boards of Contract Appeals grew out of a
need to arrive at the resolution of claims without resort to the
COUrts.2O By virtue of utilization of the Boards of Contract Appeals,
however, there is built up a substantial base of precedentiallaw in
the federal procurement law field. This has been beneficial to those
who deal with the government as well as to those who act on its
behalf. The government must manage extensive programs under
multiple regulations and numerous contract clauses which, standing
alone do not resolve all possible questions and, of course, cannot
resolve fact disputes. The decisions of the Boards of Contract Ap
peals fill this need.
Needless to say the Boards' decisions are not always favorable
to the government agency presenting its side of the dispute. This has
not produced an antipathy between agencies and administrative
judges serving on their Boards of Contract Appeals. Rather, there is
a feeling of general respect despite disagreement with any particular
result. In fact, it was largely through the efforts of the federal pro
19. S. REP. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Scss. 2-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo &: AD. NEWS 5235, 5236-38.
20. It might be said that because the total dockets of these Boards arc probably less
than four thousand c:ascs, it would not unduly burden the court system to have these
cases heard in court. The number of cases is not necessarily revcaling however. The last
case the author heard as a judge on the Armed Forces Board of Contract Appeals in
volved a claim for thirty-seven million dollars and lasted sixty-seven full trial days. It
was then settled at which time the attorneys estimated that to complete the tria1 presenta
tion would take at least another sixty-seven trial days.
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curement bar that a model code was developed for state and local
procurement fashioned after the federal experience. 21
III.

SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS

The hearing procedures in Social Security cases as set forth in
the federal regulations22 provide the same essential rights to claim
ants as are found in other federal agency hearings. They are not
adversary hearings, however, because there is no attorney present to
advocate the government's position. 23 Moreover, pleadings, nor
mally required in other federal agency hearing procedures, are not
required.
The discovery procedures common to many other federal ad
ministrative hearings are not generally employed in Social Security
hearings, although subpoena powers exist and claimants have the
right to cross-examination. Upon proper motion, claimants may
cross-examine the government examining physicians and, of course,
any medical or vocational expert, called by the administrative law
judge to testify at the hearing. 24 The administrative law judge is
charged with the additional function of ensuring that missing mate
rial reports are obtained,25 a function not normally assigned to the
21. MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE (1979).
22. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.9()()...995, 416.1400-.1494 (1983).
23. The Social Security Administration has established a government representa
tive program which at this writing is still in a test stage but in any event is not expected to
include the majority of cases being heard. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.965,416.1465 (1983).
24. Any party to a hearing has a right to appear before an administrative law judge
and to present evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(a), 416.1450(a) (1983).
25. Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982); Hankerson v. Harris,
636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1980); Daniel v. Mathews, 567 F.2d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1977);
Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224,229 (3d Cir. 1975); see also the concurring opinion
of Justice Brennan in Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952 (1983) in which he states in
pertinent part:
I join the Court's opinion. It merits comment, however, that the hearing
respondent received,. . .if it is in any way indicative of standard practice, re
flects poorly on the Administrative Law Judge's adherence to what Chief Judge
Godbold has called his "duty of inquiry":
(T]here is a 'basic obligation' on the [administrative law judge) in these
nonadversarial proceedings to develop a full and fair record, which obliga
tion rises to a "special duty . . . to scrupulously and conscientiously ex
plore for all relevant facts" where an unrepresented claimant has not
waived counsel. This duty of inquiry on the [administrative law judge)
would include, in a case decided under the grids, a duty to inquire into
possible nonexertional impairments and into exertional limitations that
prevent a full range of work.
Id. at 1959 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1364
(11th Cir. 1982». After citing many cases Justice Brennan continued:
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trier of fact. The Social Security judge also carries the burden of
conducting the examination of the claimant and other witnesses at
the hearing when the claimant is unrepresented and, where the
claimant is represented, of conducting sufficient examination to com
plete the testimony to his satisfaction.
The judge may call upon a medical or vocational expert to tes
tify at the hearing, and has the further obligation to develop addi
tional medical evidence after the hearing if that appears appropriate.
For example, a claimant may appear at a hearing with a medical
report indicating a recent development of, or new medical opinion
regarding his or her physical condition which requires further exam
ination or the input of independent medical opinion. It may be clear
from the hearing testimony or a report received at the hearing that
psychological testing is important and therefore it will be ordered at
government expense. A fair proportion of disability cases involve
psychiatric impairments or combined psychiatric and physical im
pairments and the difficulties in assessing the existence and actual
effect of such impairments often present extremely complex factual
judgments. 26
The problem in assessing pain allegations also can be readily
recognized. It is illustrated in the numerous court decisions remand
ing cases for further detailed consideration of such allegations even
in the absence of clear clinical findings supporting the allegations. 27
The "duty of inquiry" derives from claimants' basic statutory and constitu
tional rights to due process in the adjudication of their claims, including a de
nollO hearing. p-ee Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-335, 339 (1976),
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-404 (1971). See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970»). Inherent in the concept of a due process
hearing is the decisionmaker's obligation to inform himself about the facts rele
vant to his decision and to learn the claimant's own version of the facts. (Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 465, 580 (1975).)
Id. at 1959 n.l. Justice Brennan noted that "in her brief to this Court, the secretary
acknowledges that the Social Security regulations embody this duty and relies upon it in
answering respondent's Due Process contentions." Id. at 1959-60.
26. Not only is it common to find a difference of medical opinion in the record but
there is often apparent confiict between the opinion given in support of a patient's disa
bility claim and the doctor's own treatment notes or his reports to other sources. Beyond
that there is the critical question of how the medical impairment in fact functionally
restricts the particular individual, an issue rife with subjective considerations, and one
which can become even more ethereal where claims of psychiatric illness are alleged. An
attorney representing a client in a non-adversary hearing. must strictly adhere to the
bar's standards of ethical conduct in presenting documentary evidence and sworn testi
mony. Since the witnesses' credibility depends in large part upon compliance with their
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the attorney must, to the
best of his or her ability, see that this is done.
27. It is well established law in all the federal circuits that the administrative law
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The problem may be put into proper perspective best by asking how
this can be done without simply accepting the allegations and
thereby converting the disability process into a self certification pro
cedure, a result certainly not intended by the law. Clearly, the ques
tion is a factual question. Just as clearly, without outside
investigation, the corroboration of the allegations and the proof to
show the true functional restrictions in a given case is going to be less
than what one would normally expect in a litigated personal injury
case, for example, where the amount of money at stake may in fact
be far less than in the average disability hearing. 28 Obviously the
taxpayer has an interest in seeing that some reasonable accomoda
tion is made to provide a reasonably fair result and this requires at a
bare minimum a detailed review of every observation in the written
record, a complete examination of the witnesses and a thorough
comparison for inconsistencies. When it is considered that medical
reports provided by treating and consulting· physicians sometimes
consist of sparse clinical findings and conclusions based principally
on the claimants statements of symptoms the magnitude of the credi
bility issue29 comes into finer focus, and so then does the importance
of the role of the trier of fact.
judge has the duty to evaluate and assess subjective complaints. Gallagher v. Schweiker,
697 F.2d 82, 83-84 (ld Cir. 1983); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir.
1982); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982); Marcus v. Califano,
615 F.ld 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris, 602 F.ld lOS, 107 (5th Cir. 1979); Rico
v. Secretary, 593 F.2d 431, 433 (1st. Cir.) cerr. denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt v.
Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1978); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 F.2d 383, 386 (6th
Cir. 1978); Thome v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 1976); Miranda v. Secre
tary, 514 F.2d 996, 1000 (lst Cir. 1975); Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956, 957 (8th Cir.
1974); DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel v. Richardson, 441
F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1971); Kutcbman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1970);
Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1965); Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d
833, 838 (10th Cir. 1964).
28. The significant economic impact not only for the claimant as an individual but
for the tax paying public is highlighted by the volume of claims (over 300,000 requests
for hearing in fiscal year 1982), in what has been termed ''probably the largest adjudica
tory system in the western world," Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954 n.2 (1983)
(quoting J. MAsHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ Be P. VERKUlL, SOCIAL
SECURITY HEAJUNGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA
TION HEARING SYSTEM xi (1978», and by the amount of money involved, which has
been estimated as high as $100,000 per case in remarks attributed to then Associate Com
missioner Louis B. Hays at the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference on
March 14, 1983. Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference Letter (April 28, 1983).
Further, the number of cases pending in the federal Districts Courts has risen dramati
cally with twice as many cases being filed in fiscal year 1983 as in fiscal year 1982.
29. It is well settled that the administrative law judge is expected to make credibili
ty findings. See, e.g., Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.ld 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983); Andrews
v. Schweiker, 680 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1982); Walker v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 820
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Social Security administrative law judges' monthly production
figures over the past five years show substantial increases. 30 Addi
tional support staff and word processors are partially responsible.
Production "goals" of twenty-five case dispositions per month have
risen to forty or fifty in an attempt to keep pace with increases in the
number of requests for hearings. Low producing judges are coun
seled and in some cases formal removal actions have been instituted.
There is no indication that there is any policy to counsel judges pro
ducing sixty to one hundred case dispositions per month. However, it
is obvious that there are differences in perception as to how much
time a judge needs to spend on a case to reasonably carry out his
duties. These differences necessarily implicate the practical aspects
of thoroughly obtaining and reviewing the documentary evidence
and of conducting thorough inquiry at the hearing. Public concern
with this inconsistency is perhaps muted by high reversal rates. 3l A
quick hearing and short decision is quite acceptable to the claimant
who has won his case. Nevertheless administration concern with the
rise in reversal rates, paralleling increased receipts and calls for in
creased productivity, resulted in abolishment of the short form mem
orandum decision in reversal cases and the substitution of the
requirement that all decisions be long form decisions explaining the
rationale for the reversal.32
Human nature being what it is, some judges who are pressured
to get out more cases in a non-adversary setting may find it easier to
speed things up by acting more on instinct than on thoroughness. If
that is done, of course, the ultimate loser is either the claimant or the
(9th Cir. 1976); Melendez v. Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (D. Mass. 1982);
Sclewich v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 191, 195 (D. Mass. 1969).
30. The number of requests for administrative law judge hearings in the area of
disability benefits has risen from 226,200 in 1979 to 326,300 in 1982. The number of
requests processed has increased from 210,775 in 1979 to 300,000 in 1982. S. REp. No.
648 97th Cong., 2d Scss. 20 (1982), reprinle" in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
4373,4391.
31. In the first quarter of 1982 the percent of cases reversed after initial denials was
57.3 and after terminations was 65.4.1".
32. The concern is further rcflcc:tcd by the Social Security Disability Amendments
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421 (Supp. v
1981», which required an ongoing review of administrative law judge decisions by the
Social Security Administration. Commonly referred to as the "Bellmon review" the re
quirement grew out of congressional concern over the high percentage of cases that were
being granted by administrative law judges. The question is not free of controversy. See
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE II
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. Ill, 98th Cong., 1st
Scss. (1983).
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taxpayer depending upon the result, but consistency also suffers as
does integrity. When conflicting interests are not properly balanced,
the result is a subtle corrosion. Whether this is stated in terms of
intrusion upon the "independence" of the judges or "due process" or
meeting "goals" matters little for what is contemplated by law is
frustrated in fact. The problem is created by a number of factors: the
enormity of the caseload; the complexity of the cases; the absence of
truly objective standards;33 the tendency of the courts to impose
deadlines on processing;34 the desire of the agency to obtain ''uni
formity" despite the unique nature of each case and the clash of two
different disciplines; the policy makers and administrators, who are
inclined to view the larger picture in terms of dollars and case dispo
sitions; and the judges, who are inclined to view the individual case.
Unless truly objective standards can be developed and promul
gated there will continue to be, as there is in all litigation, the need
for the trier of fact. As long as there is such a need, one thing is clear:
The solution does not lie in diluting the judge's role because there
are no short cuts to that form of justice.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the scope of federal and state administrative hearings, it
is , or at least should be, evident to the practicing bar that sooner or
later most practicing lawyers will find themselves with a client who
must pursue the administrative hearing route as a substitute for, or
prerequisite, to any court action. Because of burgeoning court dock
ets and the widely accepted agency hearing process before a quali
fied judge insulated from outside in1luence, it can be expected that
this process will expand rather than contract. Nor is it idle specula
tion to expect that ever increasing admissions to the bar and broader
awareness, or evolving establishment, of legal rights will increase
33. Judges, no matter how experienced in hearing and deciding medical cases are
not medical doctors. It is simplistic to say that confticting medical opinion is easily re
solved by lay people by reference to "objective" medical evidence. This is particularly
true because the federal courts require concise judicial evaluations of pain and require
that substantial weight be given to opinions of treating physicians. Wiggins v. Schweiker,
679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 840 (11th Cir.
1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981). If it were simple to quan
tify objective medical evidence in terms of functional restrictions, then regulations would
exist to control particular decisions. Such regulations do not exist, however, except in the
most clear cut cases. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-.1599 app. (1983).
34. Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), un. granted, 103 S.Ct. 1873
(J983)(No. 82-1371); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); Blankenship v. Ma
thews, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), em.
denied 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Crosby v. SSA, 550 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Mass. 1982).
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caseloads significantly in some areas. The lawyer advising corporate
clients involved, even tangentially, with federal or state contract or
grant programs will soon discover that some knowledge in these ar
eas may be vital to a client's interests. If these areas are considered
too broadly as "specialty" areas, the time to consult the specialist
may be too late and the evidence to prove the case too little since
concurrent records far surpass later recollection. The latter principle
applies equally to individual clients in many areas, the most evident
of which is where causation and resultant damage issues are in
volved and most certainly in any claim involving medical issues. Ad
ministrative law, once considered a highly specialized field of little
interest to the general practitioner, is now a field which touches all
areas in the practice of law. Thus an awareness of its varied
processes is as important to the bar as is a knowledge of substantive
law.
The worth of any adjudicatory system of course can also be
measured by other standards such as its economic feasibility, its pub
lic acceptance or its political implications, to mention but a few. Al
ternative processes may, in one or more areas, have greater merit.
What is important to bear in mind, however, is that the nature of
such alternatives is in reality vastly different from the existing pro
cess. Thus, the not so subtle impact of having a judge's pay raises
rest in the hands of supervisors who have valid concerns with pro
duction quotas, processing times and the cost of the program, mea
sured in part by the decisional results, can justifiably be said to
interfere with the integrity of the decision process. This fact was
clearly recognized by Congress and resulted in the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Substitute procedures involving mini
mal "due process" mandated by practical considerations and the
breadth of legal rights are found in controlling court decisions 3s but
are based on limiting rights to the type of hearing contemplated by
the Administrative Procedure Act and should not be equated to it.
Once that right is granted it should not be watered down by practical
and policy considerations so that it loses its intended purpose.
Rather those considerations should encourage finding ways to pro
vide the right more effectively by eliminating flaws in the system to
the extent possible but always consistent with the true purpose of the
hearing procedure. This problem takes on much larger proportions
in facing the enormous workload of an agency such as the Social
35.
(1976).

Schweiker v. McClure. 456 U.s. 188 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319
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Security Disability Program than it does in other federal agencies.
Nevertheless, the principle should be the same as long as the recog
nized method of deciding cases is the hearing process. Congressional
action in the Social Security area has concentrated primarily on pro
tection of claimants' rights and changes in Social Security proce
dures apart from the hearing procedure. The federal court cases
however have been virtually unanimous in recognizing and enforc
ing the duty of administrative law judges to provide fully and exactly
what the Administrative Procedure Act and federal regulations re
quire in hearing and deciding cases. 36 There is no question but that
those who are disabled should be given benefits. The corollary is that
those who are not disabled should not be given benefits. In a hearing
process which has only one side appearing, it is all the more incum
bent on the trial judge to be thorough to insure that justice is done.
Whether a different or less involved procedure would meet the
requirements of due process is determined by the three prong test set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. 37 Mathews
requires an analysis of the private interest to be protected, the effec
tiveness of existing procedures in reasonably guaranteeing those
rights and the pros and cons of additional or substitute procedures. 38
If the question is, however, whether the federal administrative hear
ing procedure as currently mandated by federal law and regulation
can provide what it promises to the public, the answer is clear. It can
if the federal agency wants it to do so and if the administrative law
judges fully and faithfully carry out their sworn duty. The agency
demonstrates its intent in direct proportion to the extent it cooperates
in supporting and honoring its obligations set forth in its own regula
tions establishing that procedure. Justice requires the effective recog
nition and protection of lawful rights and correspondingly the
enforcement of lawful obligations. It requires the fair resolution of
36. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983); Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d
966 (11th Cir. 1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Wiggins v.
Schweiker, (11th Cir.1982); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1980); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris, 602 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979);
Rico v. Secretary, 593 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), em. dmieti, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt v.
Califano, 581 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1978); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 F.ld 383 (6th Cir. 1978);
Daniel v. Mathews, 567 F.ld 845 (8th Cir. 1977); Thome v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580
(4th Cir. 1976); Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1975); Miranda v. Secre
tary, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975); Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.ld 956 (8th Cir. 1974);
DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193
(3d Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348
F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1965); Celebrez:ze v. Warren, 339 F.ld 833 (10th Cir. 1964).
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. lti. at 335.
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factual disputes applying accepted principles of lawful authority. It
is therefore incumbent upon policy makers and administrators, and
not only upon judges, to cooperate in seeing that this is done. If the
cost in terms of time or money is too high that is a determination
that should be openly addressed jointly by those who make the law
and those who set policy and administer programs but not by judges
who take an oath to faithfully carry out their responsibility to pro
vide what the existing law requires. The judge's singular interest is,
and should be, only to render an impartial decision after thorough
inquiry and review. When these functions are merged they tend to
compromise in practice what should only be compromised by or
derly, open, legislative and regulatory processes. In this process the
practicing bar has an obligation to become better informed and to
take an active part, not so much from a self interest standpoint, but
from the higher standpoint of securing an orderly and effective sys
tem of justice intended to serve not only individual interests but the
public at large.

